DigeeBooks

Was Britains implementation of NATO strategy credible? After the adoption of Flexible Response in 1967 NATO relied on conventional forces to defend the West. Britain had a central role in NATOs plans, but was British defense planning adequate for the task? How did the Government plan for the use of the conventional Armed Forces for the range of operations it was committed to? How were the Armed Forces to be mobilized, and what was the detail of the planning for mobilization?In 1967 MC14/3 was adopted as the overall strategic concept by NATO. It relied on an escalatory deterrence, from conventional through tactical nuclear strikes to strategic nuclear attack. This is commonly known as Flexible Response and replaced NATOs trip-wire response. The declared principal of the strategic concept was to reduce the chance of mistakenly starting a nuclear war, meeting force with like force, and raising the nuclear threshold in the event of actual war.By using newly available documents from British and other archives, this volume will show that far from being a flexible strategy, in the event of a war it was doomed to failure. The concept was compromised by the failure of the Alliance members to provide one of the main legs of the conventional deterrent – sustainability.This book analyses the paradox between the public face of defense policy and the practice. The book assesses whether the planning would have worked, and what would have happened in Europe if war had broken out. To answer this question the research looks at the conflicts in the Falklands and the Gulf to assess the feasibility of the plans in place.Elements upon which British defense depended were still being built more than twenty years after the new strategy was adopted. Defense policy in Britain was concerned less with the threats the country faced than with just how little could be spent on defense.Never Ready is extensively illustrated with contemporary photographs, many in color, and specially commissioned diagrams, color artworks and maps.

Never Ready: NATO's Flexible Response Strategy, 1968-1989 (Europe@War)

By Kenton White

Introduction:

The book "Never Ready: NATO's Flexible Response Strategy, 1968-1989" by Kenton White delves into the history and evolution of NATO's Flexible Response Strategy during the Cold War era. This strategy was a cornerstone of NATO's defense policy, aiming to deter Soviet aggression and maintain peace in Europe. White examines the political, military, and strategic factors that shaped the Flexible Response Strategy, as well as its implications for NATO's military posture and decision-making during the Cold War.

Key Points:

1. Origins and Development:

The Flexible Response Strategy emerged in the late 1960s as a response to the changing geopolitical landscape of the Cold War. NATO recognized the need for a more flexible and adaptable defense strategy in light of the Soviet Union's growing military capabilities and the increasing risk of conventional and nuclear conflict in Europe.

2. Core Elements:

The Flexible Response Strategy consisted of three main elements: a forward defense posture, a range of conventional and nuclear forces, and a graduated response. The forward defense posture aimed to deter Soviet aggression by stationing NATO troops along the borders of the Warsaw Pact countries. The conventional and nuclear forces were designed to provide NATO with the capability to respond to a wide spectrum of threats, from limited incursions to full-scale invasions. The graduated response allowed NATO to escalate its military response in proportion to the severity of the aggression faced.

3. Political and Military Implications:

The Flexible Response Strategy had significant political and military implications for NATO. It signaled a shift from a strategy of massive retaliation to one that emphasized flexibility and the ability to respond to a range of threats. It also required substantial military investments in conventional forces, mobility, and nuclear weapons systems. The strategy sparked debates within NATO countries regarding nuclear sharing, arms control, and the allocation of resources.

4. Challenges and Controversies:

The Flexible Response Strategy faced several challenges and controversies throughout its implementation. Critics questioned its feasibility and effectiveness, arguing that it was too reliant on nuclear weapons and could lead to escalation and nuclear war. Others expressed concerns about the sustainability of the strategy in terms of resources, manpower, and the political will to maintain a large-scale military presence in Europe. The strategy also faced scrutiny due to its implications for arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

5. Conclusion:

White concludes that the Flexible Response Strategy was never fully ready to be implemented as envisioned due to a combination of political, military, and resource constraints. Despite its shortcomings, the strategy served as a deterrent to Soviet aggression and contributed to the maintenance of peace in Europe during the Cold War. The book sheds light on the complex decision-making processes, debates, and challenges faced by NATO in developing and implementing its defense strategy during a critical period of global tension.